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ABSTRACT: The Soviet Gulag has joined the tragic annals of what has been described as “man’s inhumanity to 
man”. Yet some prisoners, many of whom were falsely convicted, emerged from the experience maintaining their 
loyalty to the system of government that was responsible for their imprisonment. The hardship of the camp experi-
ence, and the hardship of return, stamped ex-prisoners for life. In camp, they struggled to survive. After camp they 
struggled to reintegrate, to re-unite, and for Party members, to renew their vows with the Party. This article focusses 
on Gulag prisoner and returnee accounts that profess enduring faith in the Party and the Communist project. With the 
materials that have become available, we can now begin to understand this phenomenon. Explanations include: 
Communism as secular religion, cognitive dissonance, functionalism, and the traumatic bond. As we witness a per-
sistent trend to manage national and public memory by repressing the memory of repression in today’s Russia, the 
issue of enduring loyalty among Gulag returnees may offer some insight into questions related to national memory 
and the dynamics of repressive regimes.
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RESUMEN: El “Pasado Reluciente” del Comunismo: Lealtad al Partido a pesar del Gulag.- El Gulag soviético ha 
pasado a integrar los anales de lo que se ha descrito como la “inhumanidad del hombre hacia el hombre”. Sin embar-
go, algunos prisioneros y prisioneras, muchos de los cuales habían sido injustamente condenados, emergieron de la 
experiencia manteniendo su lealtad al sistema de gobierno que había sido el responsable de su encarcelamiento. La 
dificultad de la experiencia del campo, y la dificultad del retorno, marcaron la vida de los antiguos prisioneros para 
siempre. En el campo, lucharon para sobrevivir. Después del campo, lucharon para reintegrase, reunificarse y, para 
los miembros del Partido, renovar su fidelidad a éste. Este artículo se centra en los relatos de los prisioneros y de los 
supervivientes del Gulag que manifestaron su fe por el Partido y el proyecto comunista tras su liberación. Gracias a 
los materiales que ahora están disponibles, podemos empezar a entender este fenómeno. Las explicaciones incluyen: 
el comunismo como una religión secular, la disonancia cognitiva, el funcionalismo, y el lazo traumático. Al tiempo 
que somos testigos de una tendencia en la Rusia actual a gestionar la memoria nacional y pública reprimiendo la 
memoria de la represión, el asunto de la lealtad persistente entre los retornados del Gulag nos puede aclarecer cues-
tiones relacionadas con la memoria nacional y las dinámicas de los regímenes represivos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Represión soviética; víctimas; sobrevivientes; creencia; campos de trabajo; trauma; estalinismo
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When the Russian television station, NTV, announced 
the death of Aleksandr Iakovlev on the evening of Octo-
ber 18th, 2005, the broadcaster stated that Iakovlev was 
the only former high Party leader to apologize for the “sin 
of Bolshevism”.1 The listeners were implicitly invited to 
consider the similarities between Bolshevism and reli-
gion. Among the ideological currents that converged 
within this public announcement were individual respon-
sibility, religious confession, and a repudiation of a politi-
cal ideology, now increasingly viewed with nostalgia. 
Iakovlev went from committed Communist and ideo-
logue to critic of the repressive practices of the system, 
eventually to become a chief architect of the Gorbachev-
era perestroika policies. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, he chaired the Presidential Commission on the 
Rehabilitation of Victims of Unlawful Repression which 
eventually rehabilitated over four million citizens. In the 
first post-Soviet decade, Iakovlev not only denounced the 
former political system, but encouraged people to re-
member and “repent”, even calling for the traditional No-
vember 7th Revolution Holiday to be renamed “The Day 
of Agreement and Reconciliation” (which failed because 
no one understood with what they were supposed to be 
reconciling). In a certain sense, Iakovlev escaped the 
gravitational field of one indoctrination –Communism– 
only to be drawn into another religion. By design or de-
fault the Communist Part of the Soviet Union (CPSU) ap-
propriated this role and function in the lives of some 
citizens’ – even those who went through the Gulag.
This article will present some of the faces and traces 
of Soviet Communism through the stories I gathered in 
the first decade of the 2000s, while doing research on en-
during loyalty to the Party among Gulag prisoners and 
returnees (see Adler, 2012). For purposes of discussion, 
these narratives are divided into different conceptual cat-
egories but most of them relate to the power and function 
of belief. They illustrate how Bolshevism functioned as 
a secular religion, how Communism can be viewed as a 
faith-based belief, how the Party or the movement had a 
charismatic draw for its followers, and finally the endur-
ing influence of assimilated ideology. This complex of 
factors has come to be reflected in national memory and a 
national narrative that marginalizes the Gulag, and by ex-
tension, its victims and survivors. 
With regard to the use of testimonies as historical evi-
dence, it has been argued that no history should be written 
without listening to its protagonists. Fortunately, in the 
last few decades, serious scholarly efforts have been un-
dertaken to integrate memories of mass violence into the 
writing of history, not just out of respect for the survivors 
but because any history writing that would exclude the 
voices of those who suffered would be arguably incom-
plete. In my 25 years of working with Gulag survivor ac-
counts, eyewitness testimonies have proved to be instru-
mental for reconstructing and understanding what 
happened. Such sources are particularly important, be-
cause during –and in the aftermath of– mass political vio-
lence, many stories of repression are silenced by state 
and/or self-censorship. These sources, of course, must be 
approached with a critical understanding of all their 
complexities. 
Before reflecting on the personal memories of the Gu-
lag experience, it is useful to consider the national memo-
ry of Stalinism. Every national history is a collective au-
tobiography which draws upon a wide inventory of events 
from its past. Different constituencies may select differ-
ent events and assign different meanings to the same 
events. For a dwindling generation of Russian survivors, 
the Gulag was the defining institution and experience of 
the USSR. These survivors represent millions of people 
terrorized during the Stalin era. Yet, the terror imposed by 
the state is again marginalized in today’s official version 
of Russia’s history.
In post-Soviet Russia, the fashioning of a good future 
out of a “bad past” has been facilitated by the construc-
tion of a “usable past” (see Bevernage, 2010; Gow, 2007; 
Goti, 2010) for the national narrative. Two decades after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Stalin’s popularity as-
cended in nationwide polls (48% of those surveyed in 
2012 regarded the former leader as having had a positive 
role in the country’s history)2, a reflection of the longing 
of many to restore the country’s former prestige and the 
security of a more strictly ordered society.3 This rise in 
popularity was accompanied by a sequence of measures, 
including the 2009 restoration of an ode to Stalin en-
graved in a Moscow metro station and the creation of a 
now defunct state commission to guard against the “falsi-
fication of history to the detriment of Russia’s interests”. 
There is thus an increasing, in fact recurrent, trend to re-
press the memory of repression.4 So to subvert Santaya-
na’s oft-quoted admonition, in post-Soviet Russia, those 
who do not want to be condemned by the past should re-
member their history from a positive perspective. 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
A 2006 interview with a Gulag survivor illustrates a 
number of issues that my past and ongoing research try to 
address. Just after arriving in Moscow of that year, I 
called Zoria Serebriakova to talk to her about a new pro-
ject. Zoria had been one of my interviewees in an earlier 
project that investigated the experience of return from the 
Gulag. Her father was an Old Bolshevik, a comrade of 
Lenin, and her stepfather was also a high-ranking Party 
official. Both were executed in 1937. Zoria’s mother was 
sent to the Gulag, and Zoria to an orphanage. As it hap-
pened, Zoria had just finished reading the Russian edition 
of my book on Gulag survivors that the organization Me-
morial had published, and she was eager to tell me how 
she felt about it.
She picked me up outside of a subway station on the 
outskirts of Moscow and we talked for the hour it took to 
drive to her dacha. Zoria was so anxious to express her 
opinions that we skipped the small talk and started our 
discussion even as I was climbing into her car. Zoria pas-
sionately expressed her outrage at the interaction between 
the ex-prisoners and the government when the survivors 
were released from the Gulag. However, her outrage was 
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not directed at the unrepentant behavior of the govern-
ment’s representatives, but rather at the ingratitude of the 
returnees. She exclaimed, “how could it be that they were 
not grateful to the government when they were released 
from camp? … Those times were full of opportunity”.5
She acknowledged that I had accurately reported the 
bitterness of many Gulag survivors, but she claimed that 
her fellow prisoners were misguided. The people whom I 
had described as victims and survivors were considered 
by one of their own as ingrates who had failed to appreci-
ate the opportunities afforded them in the post-Stalin era. 
At this point I started taking notes because I knew that 
this would help me understand more about enduring Party 
loyalty, which I was investigating. I knew that Zoria was 
a privileged returnee under Khrushchev, and that she sub-
scribed to the “returnee as hero” stance. According to this 
version, returning victims did not remain on the fringes of 
society, they were even sometimes received as heroes. 
After prisoners were released, they applied for and re-
ceived rehabilitation, and they looked for and found 
work. I also knew that Zoria’s mother had spent 21 years 
in Siberia, and then went on to become a Party propagan-
dist after release, so Zoria’s unwavering loyalty to the So-
viet regime and Communist Party, even long after camp, 
was not all that surprising. Zoria focused on –and was 
emphatic about– the sharp distinction between the Stalin 
regime, which she disowned, and the post-Stalin Commu-
nist Party, which she supported. 
Zoria’s loyalty was accompanied by an inability to ad-
equately recognize the validity of the bitterness of so 
many of her fellow returnees. This group –and they were 
in the majority– described themselves as having been vic-
timized by the state both during camp and after their re-
lease. Although Zoria’s allegiance to the Party (in and out 
of camp) was a minority view, she was not alone. There 
are many such examples in the life stories of survivors. 
While I felt comfortable disagreeing with Zoria’s per-
spective, I felt uncomfortable because of my difficulty in 
making sense of her authentic feelings. Her counter-intui-
tive stance points to larger questions of how a repressive 
regime becomes incorporated into the attitudes and be-
havior of the people it controls, with the consequence that 
its citizens behave in ways that preserve the polity over 
their own individual interests. 
Only by studying the narratives of people with similar 
orientations, can we understand how and why this minority 
point of view makes sense to people like Zoria. When such 
perspectives can be seen from within the experience of the 
prisoner or survivor, they may not be less distressing, but 
they will be less puzzling. This case also illustrates the 
need to subject our sources to critical scrutiny, because Zo-
ria was describing an entirely different experience than that 
of many –even most– of her fellow victims.
One of the paradoxes of Soviet Communism was that 
a system of governance that enforced its ideology by ex-
ecuting, imprisoning, and exploiting the labor of dissent-
ers, alleged dissenters, and alleged associates of dissent-
ers still retained the allegiance of some of its victims, 
sometimes for decades. A goal of the research described 
here was to understand how and why this (minority) point 
of view makes sense to the people who hold it. 
THE STUDY AND THE DATA
Until now we have only had the sketchiest knowledge 
of Gulag prisoners’ attitudes toward the CPSU and how 
their incarceration in the labor camp system affected their 
subsequent attitudes toward the Party. However, much 
material could be found on this subject in the Central Par-
ty Archive, the General Procuracy, the Supreme Soviet, 
the memoirs of Old Bolsheviks, the Memorial Archive, in 
the memoirs of returnees and the perished, and by explor-
ing the rich but vanishing trove of information stored in 
the oral histories of the survivors. 
The repression cast a broad net and imprisoned people 
with a variety of political histories. Some prisoners had 
themselves played an active part in the repressive opera-
tions. Their distress at their own misfortune was some-
times tempered by the belief that, although the system 
had erred in their particular case, the system itself was 
justifiable because conspiracies really did exist. 
Among the survivors and victims were also the dog-
matists who did not lose faith in the Party but lost faith in 
particular leaders. They switched their devotion from Sta-
lin to Lenin, blaming the terror on Stalinism. A memoir by 
Nina Gagen Torn, who spent eight years in the Gulag, de-
scribed such camp-mates as “hard-core Leninists”. They 
ardently clung to “Lenininst ideals”, a faith that allowed 
them to “live without breaking”. Hundreds of Kolyma-
bound prisoners endorsed this idea. Gagen-Torn recalled 
how, even as they were marched under armed guard, they 
sang, about their “selfless love for the people” (Gagen 
Torn, 2004: 22). These prisoners sang in spite of being 
butted with rifles, and even when they were thrown into 
the hull of the “death ships” from Vladivostok to Kolyma. 
Many were later executed, but according to this returnee’s 
account, they maintained faith in their vision of Commu-
nism to the end of their life.
In the course of this research I interviewed Natalia 
Rykova, who was age 90 at the time of our meeting. She 
was the daughter of the Old Bolshevik Aleksei Rykov 
who was executed in 1938. Natalia’s mother was also ex-
ecuted and Natalia spent years in labor camps because 
she was a family member of an “enemy of the people”. 
Following her release (after Stalin’s death) she cam-
paigned to secure her father’s Party rehabilitation. When I 
asked about her attitude toward the Party, she replied with 
a derisive question and answer: “Which Party? That 
wasn’t the Party we knew [and created]”.6 Nevertheless, 
it was important for her to strive for her father’s reinstate-
ment –even in the existing Party– “for the sake of jus-
tice”. He was reinstated under Gorbachev. 
My approach to this question of enduring loyalty em-
ploys at least four overlapping but distinguishable 
hypotheses: 
1. Communism as secular religion or faith-based belief 
that provides meaning to the lives of its citizens;
Culture & History Digital Journal 3(2), December 2014, e015. eISSN 2253-797X, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2014.015
4 • Nanci Adler
2. Cognitive dissonance – how one has to think and feel 
to convince themselves to succeed in a quest;
3. Functionalism – pragmatic concern for housing, em-
ployment, university placement, as they depend upon 
social status;
4. The traumatic bond – identification of the repressed 
with the repressors.
Victims’ accounts have offered varied insights into 
these issues.
COMMUNISM AS SECULAR OR POLITICAL 
RELIGION 
For the “loyalists”, belief in the CPSU served as a la-
bor incentive. They considered themselves to be Soviet 
patriots and the builders of socialism. Their faith in the 
morality of socialism was largely unshaken by the repres-
sion which they interpreted either as a perversion of an in-
herently good ideology or as an opportunity to “offer up”, 
as it were, tangible physical labor in support of the ideol-
ogy. The redeeming value of religious suffering, even 
martyrdom, comes to mind. Viktor Frankl has nuanced 
this notion by pointing out that “suffering ceases to be suf-
fering in some way at the moment it finds a meaning, such 
as the meaning of a sacrifice” (Frankl, 1959: 115).
It was the predicament of many that a fulfilling life, and 
perhaps life itself, depended on being in good standing 
with the Party. Some prisoners went to great lengths to 
prove their loyalty. Lev Gavrilov was arrested in 1937 and 
sentenced to ten years of incarceration. He spent the early 
war years in Kolyma, and wrote about his experiences in 
his memoirs. He entitled his story, “z/k: zapasnoi kommu-
nist” (reserve Communist) – a play on words with the Rus-
sian word zek, meaning ‘prisoner’. This narrative provides 
a graphic, but telling illustration. In his memoirs, Gavrilov 
(2004) describes how he extracted his own gold teeth to 
contribute to the war effort. When he tried to give them to 
his interrogators, they did not want to accept this offer from 
an “enemy of the people”. Gavrilov did not accept their as-
sessment that he was someone who had violated his right 
to be a Communist, hence the title of his narrative. 
The following story illustrates the religion-like quali-
ty of Bolshevism and also attests to the usurpation of 
family loyalty by the Communist Party. Oksana Lazarev-
na taught socioeconomics at Odessa University and was 
the mother of two. She was also the wife of an “enemy of 
the people”, who had been arrested and taken away. Ok-
sana was a committed Party member, but as she watched 
the arrest of one after another of her cohorts, she suspect-
ed that the enemy had “penetrated the Party, and it was 
the NKVD [Stalin’ secret police]”.7 One day, while Ok-
sana was nursing her infant son, they came for her too. 
The NKVD agents tore the baby from her, and dispatched 
her sons to her parents. Oksana was brought to an Odessa 
prison. There, the suspicions she harbored when she was 
free were confirmed by what she witnessed in prison. 
By the time Oksana was sent on to the Gulag, she had 
resolved to “clear the names of honest Communists”.8 
From her barracks, she began to write letters to Stalin and 
the Central Committee. She charged that, “lawlessness 
reigns in the organs of the NKVD … it has lead to the 
destruction of the Odessa Party ranks and many sincere 
Leninist-Communists”.9 Her camp-mates were terrified. 
They warned, “you will have to give these letters to the 
NKVD authorities in the camp. Don’t you understand 
what the consequences will be? You will die, and you will 
kill your children”. In her response, Oksana illustrated 
how the human dedication to a set of values can override 
even so strong a human devotion as motherhood, let alone 
personal survival. She declared: “I am a Communist in 
the first place, and after that a mother”.10 Oksana was 
transferred, and her story, recorded in the memoirs of a 
camp-mate, ends there. This author, also a committed 
Party member, was writing in 1963, and was clearly in-
spired – if not constrained by – the Khrushchevian vision 
on how to frame the past. Witness her conclusion to Ok-
sana’s story: 
In these days of the triumph of truth and justice, the 
complete unmasking of the cult of personality of Stalin, 
the restoration of the Leninist principles in life and Par-
ty leadership, I would love to know what ever happened 
to Oksana Lazarevna – a sincere Communist with a 
Capital C.11
We know that it is unlikely that Oksana even survived 
or made it to transport to the next camp. What is likely is 
that she maintained her faith until the very end. Others in 
this category re-conceptualized the camp experience to 
come out in favor of Party values. 
What can such narratives tell us? From most of the ac-
counts of committed communists, the question of “why”, 
and the issue of guilt (Die Schuldfrage), as Karl Jaspers 
so aptly termed it, was not much more relevant than they 
would be for a religious devotee. Personal misfortunes 
are accepted with resignation or satisfaction in the fulfill-
ment of a greater purpose for the collective, the Party, and 
the motherland. While the cognitive frames of secular 
systems answer what and how questions, religion answers 
why questions – the purpose and meaning of events. A 
further distinguishing characteristic of religious systems 
is that their claims are not falsifiable. As Bolshevism in-
creasingly came to operate as a non-falsifiable system, it 
merged with the practice of religion. Inconsistent empiri-
cal evidence –if admitted at all– could be interpreted as 
serving a higher purpose. 
People live for belief systems, die for them, and kill 
for them, and as these stories illustrate, for ardent believ-
ers, allegiance is not impaired by contradictory evidence. 
Some of the stories suggest that there was no contradic-
tory evidence because the world view of true believers 
admitted none.
In addition to the immortality attendant to belonging 
to the collective, Bolshevism promised a workers’ para-
dise in this life – a promise that seemed credible because 
it was consonant with the Russian Orthodox belief that an 
ultimate paradise was achievable here on earth.12 Howev-
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er, Bolshevism did not have an eternity to create this par-
adise. So, how does one account for the failure to deliver 
on their promise in this life? It appears that this conun-
drum was resolved by a combination of denial of official 
misbehavior or deflection of blame, discrediting dissident 
voices, propaganda which supported the position that the 
promised reward was just ahead and within reach, and the 
fact that there was no precisely stated delivery date.
On a different, but related note, there are many exam-
ples of how the bond to the Party was stronger than the 
maternal bond in my investigation of the stories of the so 
called “children of the repressed”, specifically daughters 
whose mothers had been Communist loyalists. And the 
loyalty that had survived in the returnee parents had also 
sometimes survived them – in their children. Many of this 
generation did not report any sense of indignation or even 
surprise at their mothers’ enduring loyalty to the Party – 
even after losing their husbands and being incarcerated in 
the Gulag. In fact, in my interviews almost two decades 
after the end of the Soviet Union, even in hindsight, these 
daughters of repressed parents had questions, but they did 
not condemn the Party; they praised the sincerity of the 
efforts that had been made to build Communism. 
A number of my interviewees whose fathers were ex-
ecuted and whose mothers were incarcerated recalled 
growing up in orphanages, and having difficult reunions 
with their returnee mothers. The mothers of this cohort 
had entered and left the Gulag maintaining loyalty to the 
Party. One such case was Dina Sidorovna, whose hus-
band was executed and who spent ten years in the camps 
and longer in exile. After camp, Dina would not even 
commit to babysitting for her grand-daughter because 
“there might be a Party meeting”. Her emotional depen-
dence on the Party was so central to her experience of life 
that she held no (at least public) opinions contrary to the 
Party line. She was grateful to Khrushchev for liberating 
her, and never conceded that she was guilty of the crimes 
for which she was imprisoned, but did not blame those 
who had imprisoned her. The Party took priority above all 
else. Her daughter, Gerta (whose name meant “heroine of 
labor”) recalled a vivid illustration of how powerfully her 
mother was motivated by the Party. Dina was addicted to 
nicotine, and smoked incessantly, in spite of frequent ad-
monitions from everyone. Dina would respond by saying: 
“if I am reinstated in the Party, I will stop smoking, but 
now I need it for my nerves”.
A similar example can be found in the Il’in family. 
Ilía, the father, had been a prominent Communist Party 
official who served as the Secretary of the Kiev Provin-
cial Party Committee, and then as the Secretary of the As-
trakhan City Party Committee. He was arrested in July of 
1937, executed in November of that year in Moscow, and 
then buried in the notorious Donskoi Cemetery. Mariia, 
the mother, was the director of a silk combine in Kiev 
when she was arrested in 1937 as the “family member of 
an enemy of the people”. 
Upon their parents’ arrest, Mariia (their daughter) and 
her two brothers, Feliks and Vladimir, were sent to or-
phanages.13 Vladimir had turned sixteen shortly after his 
arrival at the children’s home, so he was soon dispatched 
to a camp in the Far East. Mariia’s mother had managed 
to keep track of her children’s whereabouts even from 
camp, and begged the authorities to take her son out of 
the Gulag and send him to the front so that he could die 
an honorable death. But the authorities paid little heed to 
the requests of families of “enemies of the people”. Her 
plea was not granted, and Vladimir died in the camp.14  
Mariia, reflecting on her mother’s life, tried to under-
stand how her mother had dealt with the personal and ma-
terial losses of the repression. In brief, she concluded that 
those losses were bearable because they were not what 
her mother most valued in life. She told me: “My mother 
was very bright, she found happiness not in material 
things, but in spiritual things. Spiritual was not God, but 
the Party – you give your life in service and sacrifice”. 
Having found this spiritual connectedness to the Commu-
nist ideology in the same way that others find it in reli-
gious faith, Mariia’s mother could sustain her loyalty to 
Communism, even if she had disappointments in the be-
havior of some Communists. 
Mariia herself was an idealist who was inspired by the 
Party, and she and her mother maintained their idealized 
vision of the Party even after their experience of repres-
sion. As Mariia explained, her mother found a way to 
look past what had happened to her own family, and fo-
cus, instead, on the goal: 
She knew there were enemies. She believed in the prog-
ress of the socialist system... She believed in the victory 
of the Revolution. She just figured there were mistakes, 
and there were chips. You know the expression “when 
you cut wood, chips fly”, she was a chip... [She reso-
lutely expected that] a just, wonderful Communist soci-
ety would be built.15
In this case, that belief passed from one generation to 
the next. 
However, the increasing public attention to the repres-
sion under Gorbachev was having an unanticipated influ-
ence on Mariia. Mariia found it harder to maintain her 
belief in Communism after the information from the ar-
chives became public. This challenge to her faith in Com-
munism was confusing because the archives should not 
have revealed much more than she already knew from 
personal experience. A new meaning to old events was 
now reflected back to Mariia through the response of a 
different audience. 
Until Gorbachev lifted the censorship on public dis-
cussions of the terror and exposed it to the scrutiny of 
public discourse, Mariia had been able to maintain a lim-
ited view of the chronology and scope of the repression. 
Now she was forced to revisit and critically assess the 
old, mutually validating interpretations of the repression 
that she had learned from her mother and her cohorts. 
She admitted: “I was the last of everyone I knew to really 
understand that so much of the system of repression 
started with Lenin, we always wrote everything off to 
Stalin”.16 
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Mariia would have preferred to remain oblivious to 
this because it undermined so much that was foundational 
to her understanding of her family and her country. She 
explained, “it was very hard, you lose the ground beneath 
your feet because you don’t understand what the truth 
is”.17 She wondered if, perhaps, her father had died in 
vain and her mother had labored in vain. She reluctantly 
acknowledged, “I guess what they did wasn’t right, but 
they were fighting for the good of the people, sincerely 
fighting. It was not for themselves”.18 As we talked, it be-
came clear that the part that “wasn’t right” presumably 
referred to her father’s work in Kiev. 
Mariia acknowledged being “very upset” by the fact 
that her father had occupied a high position –Secretary of 
the Provincial Committee in Kiev– at the time of the 
1932-33 famine in Ukraine. She could not understand 
how he could have overseen the Party’s murderous poli-
cies of confiscating grain from starving peasants. She 
claimed that her mother was unaware of this, though they 
had all been living there at the time. 
I asked Mariia if, perhaps, her mother knew what was 
happening but had considered it too risky to discuss the 
famine with Mariia, unless she could circumscribe the 
mass starvation with an ideological justification. This risk 
would have been at two levels: for one, it might have di-
minished the Party’s standing in Mariia’s eyes; for anoth-
er, any balanced discussion of Party policy could have 
been interpreted as an expression of anti-Soviet senti-
ments. Mariia conceded that these would be plausible 
grounds for her mother’s censorship.
Ironically, the very archives that Mariia had dreaded 
to read, provided her with a potentially positive view of 
her father. This provides a rich example of the Catch 22 
legal/ethical conundrum that still stymies the rehabilita-
tion process. When Mariia was finally able to read his 
case file, she discovered that he had been accused of dis-
agreeing with the Party’s policies in the villages. If this 
was really true, rather than fabricated charges trumped 
up to justify executing him for other reasons, then she 
could valorize her father as a “hero”. However, the ma-
terials necessary to corroborate her speculation were not 
accessible. And though she was aware that most of the 
charges in these files were fabricated, she was comfort-
ed by the hope that her father was nobly guilty as 
charged. 
Yet another of my interviewees, Evgeniia Smirnova, 
had a much less positive view of the Party and the sys-
tem. This daughter of repressed parents went to work for 
the organization Memorial. As Evgeniia gathered stories 
of victims, she struggled to understand how her ideologi-
cally principled mother and her similarly principled co-
hort could have remained devoted to a system that had 
victimized them, along with millions of others. She rec-
ognized that her mother’s devotion to Communism pro-
vided her life with an enduring sense of meaning, such 
that even the labor camp could be a satisfying labor of 
love, but Evgeniia found it painful to think about how dif-
ferent and devoid of meaning the incarceration must have 
been for the majority of the victims. 
She lamented, 
Look at who is listed in [Memorial’s publication] 
Rasstrel’nye Spiski (Execution Lists).19 People with a 
low education, accused of anti-Soviet agitation. It’s just 
horrible... These poor souls did nothing, they had no re-
lationship to the system whatsoever ... they didn’t both-
er anyone...20
Evgeniia wondered why her mother and her mother’s 
peers had retained their ideological beliefs during and af-
ter the Gulag, when the political outcome seemed so dif-
ferent from what they had originally expected. She con-
trasted this with her own outcome-dependent assessment 
of the Communist Party  and that of others: “There are 
people who, when faced with new circumstances, change 
their opinion”. She attributed her mother’s changeless 
convictions to her “internal constitution”. Evgeniia also 
recognized that her mother and many of her dedicated 
peers had framed the Gulag experience as a meaningful, 
redeeming ideological journey destined to achieve the 
goals of Communism. Retaining their beliefs may also 
have helped loyalists survive the camp and post-camp ex-
periences, and so their enduring allegiance was, at the 
very least, a matter of self-preservation.
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
A 1957 doomsday cult study recognized a stratagem 
for reconciling the difference between expectation and re-
ality and identified it as “cognitive dissonance” (Festinger, 
1957). When people are coerced by circumstances into 
behaving in a way that is in conflict with their cognitions, 
there is a tendency to alleviate the ensuing psychological 
tension by changing their thinking to fit their behavior.21 
One of the relevant points is that social consensus and 
social validation are mainstays of individual beliefs. 
Thus, the larger the community of believers, the greater 
the subjective confidence in the validity of the belief 
(Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1997). Since the 1920s, when 
all competing factions were banned, the Communist Par-
ty had a monopoly on power in the Soviet Union. In this 
climate, “fitting in” by exhibiting partinost (a sense of 
Party) was essential to normative social function and 
sometimes even physical survival. 
Following Stalin’s death in 1953, the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet issued an amnesty that liberated 1.2 mil-
lion Gulag prisoners. Subsequently, the newspaper Pravda 
published the following letter from a teacher in Kishinev: 
The decree is clear evidence that we are successfully 
moving along the road to communism in our country… 
The decree is a historical document which mobilizes 
and inspires our countrymen to new labor achievements 
for the glorious goal of the complete victory of commu-
nism, in whose name the Great and unforgettable Com-
rade Stalin labored to the last heartbeat.22
It is interesting to note the perspective on the issue of 
prisoners being released. This letter-writer does not ques-
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tion why so many fellow citizens were incarcerated in the 
first place. Nor does the letter address the fact that an 
even slightly greater number still remained in the camps. 
It takes the amnesty decree to be an affirmation of the 
good work of the Party and the Soviet government rather 
than an indictment of Stalinism. Other writers to Pravda 
may have raised these concerns and were not published, 
or worse – and there may not have been such a teacher 
from Kishinev. 
Whether this letter was written by a teacher or the edi-
tors of Pravda it can be understood as a cognitive strata-
gem for turning the dissonant perceptions of the Party as 
repressor into consonant perceptions of the Party as lib-
erator. Its propagandistic success will depend on the read-
iness of individual readers to ignore dissonant facts. 
 Examples of countervailing consonant evidence to 
reduce dissonance are provided by loyalists who call at-
tention to the industrial, educational, and social benefits 
provided by Communism, trumpet the scientific achieve-
ments in the name of the Party and the motherland, and 
laud the Party’s successful mobilization of the nation’s 
resources to wage and win the Great Patriotic War. 
FUNCTIONALISM
Functionalism is the least complex explanation for the 
phenomenon of post-camp Party loyalty. Membership in 
the Communist Party, offered instrumental social advan-
tages for housing, job placement, and professional ad-
vancement (Inkeles and Bauer, 1961). In the 1950s and 
1960s, many Communist returnees met with dissident 
historian Roy Medvedev, so I interviewed him for this re-
search. According to Medvedev, there were no uniform 
stories of how former prisoners related to the Party, but a 
number of individual stories offer informative portrayals. 
Some stories began simply with the returnee’s apoliti-
cal pursuit of ordinary material satisfactions that had long 
been denied. He described a woman who, upon return 
from the Gulag said, “I am disappointed in everything 
and believe in nothing anymore, but I have one desire – 
not beauty, not love, but to eat ice cream every day…”. 
The pursuit of such immediate satisfactions was fairly 
common among the deprived and emaciated returning 
prisoners. She recalled how much she loved ice cream in 
her childhood, how little food there was in the camp, and 
how the luxury of eating ice cream epitomized her image 
of the good life. However, in order to eat ice cream regu-
larly she had to have a refrigerator for the ice cream, and 
an apartment for the refrigerator, and a pension to pay for 
the apartment. All of this was contingent upon restored 
social status, a very political goal. If an ex-prisoner could 
receive rehabilitated status, with Party rehabilitation, the 
chances of a normal civil life, including material benefits, 
were much greater.23
A TRAUMATIC BOND
The “Stockholm Syndrome”, or traumatic bond, is a 
recognized psychosocial process whereby forced isola-
tion, anxiety, physical threat, and other forms of stressful 
conditions can lead to social bonding between jailers and 
prisoners or captors and hostages (Simpson and Roles, 
1994). 
The Soviet state and the Communist Party were very 
adept at using their monopoly of rewards and punish-
ments, particularly in the Gulag, to construct a relatively 
closed system. Witness another letter published in Pravda 
in 1953, and attributed to an ex-prisoner:
We are the children of our Soviet motherland-mother. 
Maybe we committed an offense, disobeyed, and moth-
er punished us. But can we really hate her for that? She 
punished, but she also forgave and she once again em-
braces her children!24
From a psychological and social perspective, such 
people have never left prison. They have incorporated 
their oppressor’s belief system, they blame themselves, 
and they continue to seek security in reconciliation with 
the Communist Party as parent.
ASSMILIATION OF – OR ACCOMODATION  
TO – IDEOLOGY?
One of the complexities of dealing with a history of 
past repression is assessing the meaning of Party alle-
giance. For example the question of how far down the 
chain of command of a repressive regime should culpa-
bility be assigned remained open in Iraq after the over-
throw of Saddam Hussein. Among other failed transi-
tional justice measures, de-Ba’athification policies, 
introduced shortly after the fall of the regime, created an 
“epic struggle” between the regime’s opponents and 
supporters, and with regard to what principles of justice 
should be applied to the lower level functionaries.25
Some saw their wholesale dismissal as a form of “col-
lective punishment”, while others resented the fact that 
hundreds of thousands of lower-level Ba’athists, who 
may have been guilty of abuses, were permitted to remain 
in civil service positions.26 As with the lower levels of 
Nazi Party membership under Hitler and Communist Par-
ty membership in Russia, Ba’ath Party membership may 
primarily have reflected fear and careerism.27 
Still, these determinants can lead from the accommo-
dation to repression to the assimilation of and allegiance 
to a repressive ideology. This mechanism explains how it 
is possible for people to continue to maintain feelings of 
loyalty when faced with the facts of the human toll asso-
ciated with the repressive regime.
Those who had adapted to a repressive regime by ac-
quiescence and accommodation could likewise adapt to a 
non-repressive regime. But those who had adapted by the 
assimilation of the repressive ideology would probably be 
resistant to change in at least two ways: First, any evi-
dence that might conflict with their assimilated ideology 
could be re-interpreted as irrelevant or confirmatory. For 
example, human rights violations would be overshad-
owed by the demands of patriotism, and false imprison-
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ment could be viewed as a necessary personal sacrifice 
for the greater good. Second, the meaningful experience 
of feeling connected to a revered leader, a cohesive group, 
and a visionary ideology can be so emotionally satisfying 
that it needs no more confirmatory evidence than does re-
ligious faith. While the “bright future” envisioned by 
Communist ideology was expected to be realized in this 
life, on this earth, the fact that it has endured the contra-
dictions of the repression, the refutation of the disclo-
sures, and endless delays, suggests that it occupies a psy-
chosocial niche similar to that inhabited by “heaven” or 
“paradise” in theology. 
TRACES OF VIOLENCE:  
HOW TO FRAME THE PAST  
AND NATIONAL REMEMBRANCE
Conceptually, it is easy to differentiate the ideology of 
the Communist Party from the ideology of the Gulag. But, 
operationally, they co-evolved and sometimes merged. 
The political system generally suppressed the history of 
repression, and rehabilitation was an uneven process that 
often proceeded in opposing directions. Many discredited 
symbols of the Soviet system –including Stalin– are also 
being rehabilitated, if not officially, then unofficially. This 
affects the national remembrance of the Gulag. The fate of 
individual remembrance of the Gulag was more compli-
cated because personal and national survival are driven by 
different forces. 
Evidence from numerous studies of Gulag survivors 
suggests that the consequences of the Gulag did not end 
with its closing under Gorbachev, nor was its influence 
limited to its prisoners. The Gulag, pervaded daily Soviet 
life because it could ensnare almost anyone. And today, in 
post-Soviet Russia we are witnessing renewed repression 
of the memory of repression. The 2014 state-initiated dis-
mantling of the memorial complex at the Perm labor 
camp site is but one recent, prominent example. Vladimir 
Putin, who described the collapse of the Soviet Union as 
“the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th centu-
ry”28 argues that Russia should not be made to feel guilty 
about the Great Purge of 1937, because “in other coun-
tries, even worse things happened”.29 Accordingly, the 
current, state approved textbooks marginalize the Gulag 
while maximalizing Soviet successes. In a recent review 
of high school curriculum, the Putin administration de-
creed that one textbook will be created, with a “unitary 
vision”, in a narrative that essentially emphasizes Stalin 
as an “effective manager”. The key message should be: 
“We are citizens of a Great Country with a Great Past”; 
Putin has recommended that there be no “internal contra-
dictions” and no “dual interpretations”.30 At a 2013 meet-
ing with the Moscow Russian History teachers associa-
tion, I learned that there are no less than 31 controversial 
subjects in the history of Russia, ranging from 17th centu-
ry topics until today. One question is formulated to ad-
dress the role of Stalin’s personality. It does not refer to 
Stalinist repressions, but rather circumscribes them by 
suggesting an interpretation of this question within the 
framework of a “one-Party system dictatorship and the 
autocracy of Stalin”.31
All of these topics will require a delicate approach, 
perhaps even censorship, in order to make it into the new 
textbook. So, despite the introduction of Solzhenitsyn’s 
Gulag Archipelago into the high school literature (i.e. not 
history) curriculum –an initiative supported if not driven 
by Putin, and completed in 2010– a subtext of this history 
lesson is that the political ethos is perhaps not fully ready 
to change.
REFLECTION
Since the “bright future” of Communism never ar-
rived, looking to the “bright past” (Roginskii, 2011) of 
achievements is an artful stratagem for maintaining na-
tional pride. For many ex-prisoners and others, coming to 
terms with the nation’s past has required reassessing the 
meaning of their personal past. For the older generation 
who were committed to the Party, even while in camp, a 
disconfirmation of their original ideology could raise un-
settling questions about how they (mis)spent their lives. 
Such unsettling questions can lead to unsettling answers. 
They direct us to look at how the human need for safety, 
meaning, structure, and social cohesion can be manipu-
lated by the closed systems of repressive regimes. These 
findings might be relevant to understanding the persisting 
resistance of some citizens to look at their past and learn a 
different lesson. It is my hope that the stories of belief, 
disillusionment, and survival chronicled in my research 
will help us to understand some of the processes by which 
repression gets inside the individual. In consequence, we 
may gain a better understanding of how repressive re-
gimes are maintained.
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